	Торіс	Norway	Sweden	Finland	Iceland	Denmark	Comparative analysis
Statistics							
		Sharp fall in 2016, continued low numbers	<ul> <li>Sharp fall in 2016, continued low numbers (decreasing)</li> </ul>	Sharp fall in 2016, continued low numbers	<ul> <li>Applications for international protection in 2018 were of 70 nationalities</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Sharp drop in asylum applications from 2015→2016→2017</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>Largest group of asylum seekers second half of 2018/2019: Turkey</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Main countries of origin in 2018: Syria, Iraq 2<sup>nd</sup>, Iran 3<sup>rd</sup></li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Largest group of asylum seekers second half of 2018/2019: Iraq</li> </ul>	• The total numbe rof applications (800) was lower than in the past two years (2017: 1096 and 2016: 1133)	• Stable number from 2017-2018 (3500 vs 3523)	
	Asylum arrivals, trends over time (see attached	<ul> <li>Quotas of UN refugees increased in 2019 (to 3000)</li> </ul>	Quotas of UN refugees increased in 2018 to 5000	<ul> <li>Quotas of UN refugees: Ministry of Interior proposed increased quota in 2019 (from 750 to 1050), Ministry of Finance refused</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>About a quarter of applicants came from states in the list of safe countries of origin (193)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Large variance in recognition rates: 85% in 2015 to 36% in 2017 and 56% in 2018</li> </ul>	<ol> <li>Sharp fall in asylum arrivals post</li> <li>2015 2. UN Quota used actively 3.</li> <li>Marked variations in recognition rates</li> </ol>
	format)	Relocation of EU quota in 2017, 2018	<ul> <li>Long processing times due to the large influx of asylum seekers in 2015</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Relocation from EU, Finland relocated according to agreement</li> </ul>	• The largest groups of applicants came from Iraq (112) and Albania (108)	<ul> <li>Annual resettlement quota of 500/year dropped mid-2016; no resettlements in 2017 and 2018</li> </ul>	(SE 34, NO 69).
					<ul> <li>73% of applicants were male and 27% female; 77% of applicants were adults and 23% under 18 years of age</li> <li>Quotas of UN refugees increased in 2016 (56) and remained similar since</li> </ul>		
		<ul> <li>Downward trend in EEA labour migration</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Relatively low numbers of asylum seekers after 2015</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Labour migration shows increasing trend, deliberate government policy</li> </ul>	Lower numbers of asylum seekers compared to 2017 and 2016	Slight drop in family reunification from 2017 (7790) to 2018 (5233)	
		<ul> <li>Low number of asylum seekers</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Increase in family-related migration in 2017/2018 (permits granted)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Low number of asylum seekers</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Increased number of applications for residence permits</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Stable numbers of EU/EØS, labour and student migrants</li> </ul>	
	Trends over time; arrivals of different categories of migrants	<ul> <li>Stable number of family migrants</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Overall immigration going down slightly</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Family migrants amongst the largest groups of migrants, stable number of them</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>The total number of applications for first residence permits and renewals increased by 20% in 2016 and by another 25% in 2017</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Significant positive trend in refugee and immigrant employment from 2016-2018</li> </ul>	1. Family migrants up in SE and IC, stable in NO and SF and down in DK
	(production, families, labour, students)	Overall immigration down	• Steady increase in labour migration since 2009 (sharp increase in 2018)	<ul> <li>The immigration population has increased steady</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>On January 1, 2018 there were 43,736 immigrants in Iceland or 12.6% of the population. This is an increase from last year when they were 10.6% of the population</li> </ul>		
		• EEA labor migration dominant post opening of EU labour market in 2022, increasing until 2014	<ul> <li>Decrease in EU/EEA migration since 2012/2013</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>The proportion of foreign students has remained stable over the past few years</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Increase in family reunification of refugees</li> </ul>		

	Торіс	Norway	Sweden	Finland	Iceland	Denmark	Comparative analysis
Rules/po	olicy areas						
		• New restrictive regime introduced post 2015 (implemented in 2016, 2017, 2018)	<ul> <li>Border controls introduced in December 2015, still partly in place (Öresund)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Restrictive policies introduced as regards asylum seekers post 2015, implemented continuously</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>New legislation on foreigners in 2016 written by a cross-party committee of parliamentarians</li> </ul>	Continuation of indirect deterrence measures post- 2015	
	Description of	• Revival of cessation clauses with reference to 1951 Convention (immigration Act 37e), increasing the importance of "Landinfo" (Country of origin information)	<ul> <li>New restrictive regime introduced summer 2016 by temporary law, will (with some exceptions) be prolonger for two years until 2021</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>In 2018, a new Government Migration Policy Programme to strengthen Labour Migration was accepted</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Increased emphasis on assessing individual needs of asylum seekers and improving reception conditions</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Expansion of measures to restrict access to family reunification</li> </ul>	
	Description of overall design/of current immigration regimes (post 2015 and beyond) (forward looking), One or two examples in brief	<ul> <li>Increased emphasis on EU cooperation, external dimension, Dublin</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Temporary residence permits, strict rules on family reunification, "applying minimum standards of EU and international law", fewer grounds for subsidiary protection and humanitarian grounds only applicable if otherwise a violation of Sweden's international obligations (Section 11 of temporary law on residence permits)</li> </ul>	Emphasis on EU cooperation	<ul> <li>Increased emphasis on EU cooperation and Dublin</li> </ul>	Establishment and continuation of intra-EU border control post-2015	1. Strict regimes introduced post 2015 2. Border controls (SE, DK, NO, SF) 3. Re-nationalization and EU cooperation (exception DK), all participate in EU external dimension (DK?) 4. Towards minimum standards (SE, DK).
					<ul> <li>Emphasis on fast track procedures and safe countries of origin</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Emphasis on national measures and bilateral arrangements as opposed to international cooperation</li> </ul>	
					<ul> <li>Rights of stateless persons, f.ex for international protection</li> <li>Multiple changes, most of them of restrictive nature, to the legislation since it came into force</li> </ul>		
		• Convention status refugees now (from 2018) have shorter grace period to apply for family reunification (from 12 months to 6 months)	<ul> <li>Temporary residence permits for Convention refugees (3 years, only exception quote refugees)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Appeal times in asylum matters have been reduced</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>New requirements for family reunification and family formation (in 2016) e.g. four year waiting/ qualification period for new family members</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Pending Bill to introduce shorter duration of residence permits</li> </ul>	
	Changes in rights for persons with UN refugee status (e.g. family reunification)		<ul> <li>Restrictions on right to family reunification: only for established relationships, only if the refugee is "likely to be granted a permanent residence permit", stricter maintenance requirements, different rules on family reunification depending on when the refugee applied for asylum</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>The right to a legal aid counsel has been restricted</li> </ul>		<ul> <li>Pending Bill to introduce basis for emergency cap on family reunification</li> </ul>	<ol> <li>New restrictions for refugees.</li> <li>Exception: quota refugees. 2.</li> <li>Stricter regulation of family reunification</li> </ol>
	reunincation)			<ul> <li>The grounds for a leave to appeal to the Supreme Court have been tightened</li> </ul>		<ul> <li>Pending Bill to further reduce cash benefits</li> </ul>	
				<ul> <li>The principles of remuneration to legal aid counsels have been altered</li> </ul>			
				<ul> <li>Family reunification requirements have been tightened</li> </ul>			

	Торіс	Norway	Sweden	Finland	Iceland	Denmark	Comparative analysis
Rules/po	licy areas						
		<ul> <li>Increased requirements for family reunification and family formation (in 2017, 2018), e.g. age requirement, four year waiting period</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Temporary residence permits (13 months), very limited possibilities for family reunification (only possible if otherwise a violation of Sweden's international obligations, Section 13 of the temporary law on residence permits)</li> </ul>	Appeal times in asylum matters have been reduced	<ul> <li>Same as for UN refugee status</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Pending Bill to introduce shorter duration of residence permits</li> </ul>	
	Changes in rights for persons with			<ul> <li>The right to a legal aid counsel has been restricted</li> </ul>		<ul> <li>Pending Bill to introduce basis for emergency cap on family reunification</li> </ul>	Subsidiary protection: 1. Increased requirements for
	subsidiary protection			<ul> <li>The principles of remuneration to legal aid counsels have been altered</li> </ul>		<ul> <li>Pending Bill to further reduce cash benefits</li> </ul>	family reunification, including income requirements, age, waiting periods.
				<ul> <li>Family reunification requirements have been tightened</li> </ul>			
		<ul> <li>Temporary protection for UAMs from ages 16-18 (then expected to return)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Increased number of age assessments</li> </ul>	Appeal times in asylum matters     have been reduced	<ul> <li>Emphasis on the rights of the child throughout the legislation and in practice</li> </ul>		
	Changes in conditions for unaccompanied minors and young migrants	<ul> <li>Government "backtrack" for a limited group of UAM from Afghanistan</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Temporary legislation specifically directed at UAMs having arrived while minors but which have turned 18 during the process ("gymnasielagen")</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>The grounds for a leave to appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court have been tightened</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Has been criticized for not being properly applied</li> </ul>		
				<ul> <li>The principles of remuneration to legal aid counsels have been altered</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Family of a child under the age of 18 are in some cases entitled to international protection depending on the best interest of the child.</li> </ul>		UAM: 1. Temporary permits until 18 (NO, SE), 2. Increased age assessment (SE), 3. Shorter appeal (SF)
				<ul> <li>Family reunification requirements have been tightened</li> </ul>			
				Short residence permits to UMA			
	Revocation/ Cessation, recent	<ul> <li>Revocation ("tilbakekall") is key priority for Norwegian government, new resources</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Not really in focus in the Swedish context (to my knowledge)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Discussions about revocations/ cessation in connection to asylum seekers that have committed crimes</li> </ul>		<ul> <li>Revocation of residence permits due to changed situation in home country, p.t. Somalia, has been a priority matter in recent years and is expected to continue as result of political agreement on 'paradigm change' in Danish asylum policy</li> </ul>	Revocation: 1. Hot topic in NO and DK. Not in IC, SF, SE. 2.
	practices, national ambitions of increased use?	<ul> <li>Clause on cessation ("opphør") of refugee permits during first three years due to changes in home country</li> <li>Certain groups (Somalis and Afghans) are targeted</li> </ul>					Certain groups singled out for cessation – i.e. Somalis in NO and DK. TREND? Spread to SF, SE and IC?
		High volume					

	Торіс	Norway	Sweden	Finland	Iceland	Denmark	Comparative analysis
Rules/po	olicy areas						
	Irregular	<ul> <li>Variable estimates on number of migrants in Norway without permits</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Number of irregular migrants in Sweden is estimated to have increased due to stricter asylum rules</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Growing concern about the number of irregular migrants in Finland</li> </ul>		<ul> <li>Few estimates of irregular migrants in DK</li> </ul>	Irregular migrants: 1. On the agenda in SE, previously in NO and
	migration	<ul> <li>Norway participates in EU external dimension initiatives, stemming irregular migration e.g. in North Africa</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Irregular migrants have the right to health care and education (different rules for adults and children) but implementation is inconsistent</li> </ul>			<ul> <li>Significant number of persons in removal centres absconding: assumption that they leave for other EU member states</li> </ul>	not in DK. 2. In SF growing concern. 3. Rights for irregular migrants a topic in NO and SE
	EU migrants	<ul> <li>Falling number of EU labor migrants over the last three years</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Poor EU migrants (mostly of the Roma community) begging in the streets are considered a big problem all over the country, local attempts at prohibiting begging</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Falling number of EU migrants the latest years; Estonians the biggest group of EU migrants</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Polish migrants the most numerous group of the increasing group of immigrants in Iceland</li> </ul>	No general controversies, apart from restrictive response to instances with homeless EU migrants and to Danish citizens' invocation of EU law to secure residence in Denmark for third country family members	EEA migrants: 1. In NO positive view. 2. Fewer arrivals SF, NO, 3. In SE Roma, beggars, negative trend
		<ul> <li>Population has positive view of Polish migrants (by far the most numerous group)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Cooperation with countries of origin (Romania, Bulgaria) not very successful</li> <li>Attitudes towards this group increasingly negative compared to a few years back</li> </ul>				– attitudes, 4. More arrivals in DK.
	Return and readmission	<ul> <li>Return and assisted voluntary return are key priorities for the Norwegian government</li> <li>With fewer arrivals, numbers of returns are down</li> <li>Returning to Kabul, stating internal flight alternative</li> <li>Governments sets target</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Increased number of forced returns</li> <li>Returns to Afghanistan, also for young adults who have spent most of their lives in Iran</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Return and assisted voluntary return important for the government</li> <li>Returns still higher than before 2015</li> <li>Finland returns to Afghanistan, certain groups also to Kabul (young, healthy unmarried male without particular vulnerabilities; couples if they are young, healthy and childless do not have vulnerabilities</li> <li>Focus on readmission</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration a priority but has been difficult in practice</li> <li>Same applies to forced return as the numbers of asylum seekers are limited and therefore quite costly to return</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Return a priority issue for DK government</li> <li>Emphasis is on "motivational measures" limiting rights in order to induce voluntary returns; yet little to support that these have the intended effect – analysis of residents at one centre the last two years show that more people end up getting residence permits in DK than return to countries of origin</li> <li>Vice versa, same analysis shows that a large number of people in return positions abscond from the removal centres – investigative journalism reports suggest that they apply for asylum in other EU countries, in some cases successfully</li> <li>Within recent years upgrading of</li> </ul>	1. Return policy in all countries, 2. All but IC return to Afghanistan, 3. Difficult to motivate for AVR, 4. Focus on readmission (NO, DK, SF)
		<ul> <li>Strong focus on readmission agreements, tilt towards informal arrangements/ arrangements with third countries</li> </ul>		agreements; negotiations with Iraq have been important but unsuccessful		readmission efforts with special ambassador and liaison officers appointed for this issue at the MfA and dedicated unit working on this at Ministry of Immigration	

	Торіс	Norway	Sweden	Finland	Iceland	Denmark	Comparative analysis
Rules/poli	icy areas						
	Temporary	<ul> <li>Often UAM aged 16-18 get temporary permits until they turn 18, then expected to return</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Temporary residence permit is now the main rule for individuals who are assessed under the temporary law (as states above) the law applies to those who sought asylum after 24<sup>th</sup> November 2015</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Growing concern about the number of irregular migrants in Finland</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>A residence permit for refugees are granted for a period of four years and may be renewed after that period, unless conditions are for withdrawing it, refusing to renew for example if necessary for the security of the state or public interest</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>General emphasis on temporariness in political debate; new temporary category of asylum (mainly aimed at Syrians) introduced and length of residence permits shortened for other categories.</li> </ul>	1. Increased use of TP, 2. Focus on
(i	permits (including effects)	<ul> <li>General ambition to let the first three years be de facto temporary</li> </ul>			<ul> <li>Refugees can also, conditions met, after 4 year apply for a permanent residence permit</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>For temporary asylum category, residence permit is one year, after that extendable by two years; forcing immigration authorities to regularly review cases</li> </ul>	UAM (NO, SF), 3. Part of political debate (DK,NO), towards tp as default in Nordics?
		<ul> <li>Immigration authorities must review after three years whether cessation/return is possible and screen for revocation</li> </ul>			<ul> <li>The first four years are de facto temporary</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Since 2017, immigration authorities have further revoked nearly 1000 residence permits for Somali refugees and their dependents</li> </ul>	
F	Family migration	<ul> <li>List of changes since 2015, including age requirement (24 y), four-year quarantine, and reduced "exempt-window" for refugees (from 12 to 5 months)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Increasingly strict regulations, in particular for those applying for family reunification with refugees/ subsidiary protection status (see above)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Significant changes post 2015; reduced exempt- window for refugees; income requirements for persons with subsidiary protection</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>New legislation on foreigners (2016) introduces multiple changes</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Additional restriction adopted in 2016-2018, clearly aiming at reducing access to family reunification for 'non-western' immigrants</li> </ul>	Clamping down on this category of migrants across the Nordics
				<ul> <li>Income requirements apply also to children</li> </ul>			
		<ul> <li>Intensified qualification measures</li> </ul>	Not my field of expertise, will have to look into it further	<ul> <li>Individualized integration program (works to some extent)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Newly introduced plans from the ministry of social affairs for uniform and improved reception of refugees (both asylum seekers and quota refugees)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Since 2016 more cooperation with employers in terms of organizing e.g. language training and new "integrations-grunduddannelse" allowing for employment of refugees and family reunified persons at lower "internship" salaries with a view to re-/up-qualification of skills</li> </ul>	
	Integration	<ul> <li>Individualized integration program (not working)</li> </ul>		<ul> <li>Problems with employment, language skills, with racism</li> </ul>		<ul> <li>Since 2018 focus on "ghetto areas"; policies include tearing down older social housing complexes, changed allocation practices at municipalities, lower social welfare rates for persons living in these areas, increased penal brackets for certain forms of crime committed in these areas and compulsory public daycare for children living in these areas</li> </ul>	1. Individualized qualification programs (SF, DK, SE?), 2. Racism SF, 3. Ghetto areas, DK
		<ul> <li>Continued geographical dispersion policy of approved asylum-seekers, securing non- concentration for first five years after approval</li> <li>Super reception centres -</li> </ul>					
		specialized centres for qualified/motivated asylum seekers					

	Торіс	Norway	Sweden	Finland	Iceland	Denmark	Comparative analysis
Rules/po	olicy areas						
		<ul> <li>Trend towards emphasis on national self-interest (rather than rights)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Strong focus on "not going back to previous policy" and on harmonization with EU policy</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Emphasis on national self- interest and economic sustainability</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>New legislation was ambitious and set with cross-political references. Much was referred to human rights and the legislation had to be rights- oriented</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Trend towards economic and managerial logics at the expense of normal rule of law principles</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>Towards a temporary regime, externalization of borders</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>The current temporary law is likely to be made permanent to some extent – new parliamentary inquiry to present suggestions before 2021</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>The role of rights is downplayed</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>At the same time there was an increase in the reception of quota refugees</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Trend towards temporariness for all types of refuges</li> </ul>	
	Consequences of current regimes (individual, societal and for	<ul> <li>Switch from asylum seekers to quota refugees (and talk of a limit on the total aggregate number)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Some discussion on externalization and on the scope of the right to seek asylum</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Common European solutions also emphasized</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>The experience of the new legislation varies, and Parliament has had to make changes to make certain provisions work as planned</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>No concurrent focus on quota refugees despite lower number of spontaneous asylum-seekers</li> </ul>	<ol> <li>National self interest (general + NO + DK) (sustainability), 2.</li> <li>Solutions at EU level (NO, SE, SF),</li> <li>Temporariness DK, NO, 4. No</li> </ol>
	immigration management), perspectives and trends			<ul> <li>Discussions on a switch from asylum seekers to quota refugees</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>It has been criticized that various provisions provided for by law have not yet been implemented</li> </ul>		way back (SE) / paradigm shift (DK), 5. Less focus on individual rights, 6. Switch to quota (SF, NO, not DK)
					<ul> <li>Certain groups feared that the new legislation would lead to an increase in asylum applications, but this does not seem to be the case. However, there seems to be an increase in family unions that could potentially result in negative feedback</li> </ul>		

	Topic	Norway	Sweden	Finland	Iceland	Denmark	Comparative analysis
Discourses	(What has receive	d attention over past three years?)					
		<ul> <li>Sustainability and cost of immigration (absorption) (media)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Migration management on the EU level and harmonization and burden-sharing ("Sweden should not do more than its fair share")</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Migration management in Europe, Mediterranean situation</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Vulnerable applicants for protection and immigrants (academia and media) immigration and crime (academia and media)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Migration and asylum a dominant theme in political debates both prior to and post 2015</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>Migration management in Europe (Norway's role) – Mediterranean trends</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>"What will a new migration policy include"</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Cost of immigration, in connection to welfare state services</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Integration (academia)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Several political parties have launched significant political reform programmes in the area of asylum and immigration</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>Immigration and the welfare state (academia)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Immigration and the welfare state</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Immigration and crime</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Discourse on intolerant aspects of Islam/Muslim practice/ Islamism (gender equality</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Use of language concerning "paradigm change" across several political parties</li> </ul>	
	Dominant	<ul> <li>The migration – integration nexus</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>The cost of migration (in certain media)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Government's restrictive asylum policies inside and outside Finland</li> </ul>		<ul> <li>Significant political debate about Global Migration Compact; DK PM ultimately signed it</li> </ul>	<ol> <li>Global Compact on migration – hefty debates (DK, NO), 2. Islam</li> </ol>
	topics in media and academic	<ul> <li>Revocation (including citizenship)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Failed integration and its consequences, including crime</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Muslims and gender equality</li> </ul>			and intolerance (IC, SF, SE, NO), 4. Immigration and crime, 5.
	(2018/2019)	<ul> <li>Immigration and crime</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>UAM's, Afghans in particular, and Sweden's responsibility towards them</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>The role of populist parties in designing the immigration policies</li> </ul>			Negative social control/honour
		<ul> <li>Labour Party's restrictive migration management program (e.g. EU camps in North Africa/third countries)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Increased pressure on immigrants to integrate (talk of language test etc.)</li> </ul>				
		<ul> <li>Asylum seekers versus quota refugees</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Negative social control in certain areas, gender aspects in particular</li> </ul>				
		<ul> <li>Discourse on intolerant aspects of Islam/Muslim practice/ Islamism (gender equality)</li> </ul>	• Honour crime				
		<ul> <li>Negative social control in immigrant communities</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Incorporation of the CRC and the rights of asylum-seeking children</li> </ul>				
	Description of/	<ul> <li>Fears of politicians is that failed integration may create: increased tension between immigrant groups and majority population ("svenske tilstander")</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Segregation within/between communities, cities, schools etc. Increased criminality</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Asylum seekers are seen as economic burden</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>The unsustainable economic burden long term of refugees and their families (especially vulnerable individuals)</li> </ul>	Economic burden on welfare state	
	understandings of challenges connected with	<ul> <li>Be unsustainable economic burden long term (expensive)</li> </ul>	Unsatisfactory border controls	<ul> <li>Labour related immigration is seen as crucial for filling the sustainability gap (ageing population)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Connected to the emphasis on integration and creating valuable members of society</li> </ul>	Increased crime	1. Divided on challenges – SE
ar com polic expe (	immigration, arrivals, composition, policies and	<ul> <li>Youth crime, gangs (including second generation)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Lack of quality in Migration Agency processes and decisions, jeopardizing legitimacy of decisions and the legal rights of the individual</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Sexual criminality</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Strain on the welfare system and services in municipalities</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Lack of integration and assimilation to Danish culture</li> </ul>	more system/majority, 2. SF, NO, DK, IC: crime, 3. Economic burden, 4. Culture, values (DK, SF)
	experiences (incl. integration)			<ul> <li>Problems with gender equality; risk that the newcomers do not understand or respect Finnish values'</li> </ul>			
				<ul> <li>Marginalization of young men</li> </ul>			

	Topic	Norway	Sweden	Finland	Iceland	Denmark	Comparative analysis
Discourses	(What has rec years?)	eived attention over past three					
		Segregation	<ul> <li>Failed integration</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Cultural differences, particularly as regards religion and gender</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Unclear roles of government vs. municipalities</li> </ul>	Segregation	
		<ul> <li>Lack of first generation integration</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Long processing times have negative effects on the individuals and how they can begin integrating into Swedish society</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Welfare state guarantees certain services and rights to all, creates tensions when economy is not strong</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>No long term plan for migration in Iceland</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>"ghetto" areas</li> </ul>	
	Suggested causes of these challenges	<ul> <li>Welfare state not designed to absorb non-natives (competence levels, language)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Too many asylum seekers in a certain period of time</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Many asylum seekers have poor education, difficulties to catch up and get a job</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Composition of competence of immigrants</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Lack of job opportunities/ matching of competencies (despite statistics showing improved labour market integration)</li> </ul>	Segregation, failed integration, ghettos, competence, high numbers, negative attitudes (SE), welfare state
		<ul> <li>Composition of competence of immigrants</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Negative attitudes towards immigrants</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>High number of asylum seekers in 2015 created a panic that still continues</li> </ul>		<ul> <li>Uncertainty regarding future asylum number</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>High number of asylum arrivals during certain periods</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Insufficient resources for the Migration Agency and the border police</li> </ul>				
	Suggested solutions/	<ul> <li>Strict asylum policies</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>More focus and funding on border control</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Strict asylum policies, more open labour immigration policies</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Ongoing two different discourses: one believing there is need for strict policies and national interests then those who want to focus on human rights. Politicians want to analyze what the Icelandic society needs and how that can be made compatible with human rights</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Trend towards political rationale involving:</li> </ul>	1. National solutions (DK), 2. Strict
	measures/ programs of action	<ul> <li>Strict family immigration regulation</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Being tougher on crime/ organized crime in certain areas</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Strict family immigration regulation</li> </ul>		<ul> <li>National political actions as opposed to multilateral policymaking</li> </ul>	family reunification, 3. Values (including Swedish), 4. Stricter policies, 5. Split public (IC), 6.
	i.e. what is needed?	<ul> <li>Intensified integration measures</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Teaching "Swedish values"</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Intensified integration measures</li> </ul>		<ul> <li>Temporary stay for all types of refugees, including existing groups of resettled refugees</li> </ul>	Temporary stay
		<ul> <li>Stricter conditions for permanent residency and citizenship</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Making the temporary law permanent</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Stricter conditions for permanent residency and citizenship</li> </ul>		<ul> <li>As a result of B, focus on non- integration and specialist tracks for asylum-seekers and recognized refugees</li> </ul>	
	Ideal societal situation/ goal (is this formulated	<ul> <li>Neo-assimilation strategy</li> </ul>		<ul> <li>Seldom articulated, but government's aim is to support labour migration and control asylum</li> </ul>		<ul> <li>Clash between liberal market- driven labour integration strategy and non-integration strategy de facto limiting all refugees from access to regular labour market, housing and education</li> </ul>	
	?)	<ul> <li>Maintain universal welfare state rights (not split between newly arrived and others)</li> </ul>		<ul> <li>Important also to bring asylum costs under control and to integrate effectively those who have been granted asylum</li> </ul>		•	

	Торіс	Norway	Sweden	Finland	Iceland	Denmark
Discourses	(What has received	attention over past three years?)				
	Taboo concepts and topics (words, phrases	<ul> <li>Multi-culturalism (government encourage difference)</li> </ul>	• Depends on who you ask! Many argue that there are a lot of things you cannot say in Sweden (for fear of not being PC) but those who complain often have very good platforms from which to express their views. Debates however have become increasingly polarized, not least in 2018 and the months leading up to the September elections. The Being blatantly racist is still taboo	<ul> <li>Paperless; government encourages to skip the concept</li> </ul>		<ul> <li>Generally very few. "Nazi" might be one example.</li> </ul>
	that cannot be used)	Cultural relativism     Race (racism)				
		<ul> <li>Anti-democracy, promote gender inequality</li> </ul>				
	Perspectives on	<ul> <li>Immigrant over-representation in certain categories of crime</li> </ul>	Some focus on honour crime	<ul> <li>Immigrant over-representation in certain property crimes, violent crimes and sexual offences</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Public and media discourse on crime generally not hostile towards immigrants. Individual crime instances, including immigrants, have not caused public alarm or anti immigrant sentiments</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Immigrants over-represented in regard to certain form of crime</li> </ul>
	immigration and crime, examples	<ul> <li>Violent crime instances among newly arrived UAM (Alta and Trondheim 2018)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>UAM-s and sexual offences</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>In property crimes and assaults the victim is often another immigrant, in sexual offences Finnish minors are over- represented (cases in Oulu, Helsinki 2018)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Foreigners over-represented in prisons (15-20 percent of inmate population) about half being transit visitors</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Significant increase in labour market integration for refugees and other groups of migrants; though still gap between these groups and Danish citizens in general</li> </ul>
					<ul> <li>Statistics on local crime and immigrants not included in published crime statistics</li> </ul>	